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Summary: This paper scrutinizes technical international policy reactions to the 
subprime crisis and recession. Short-term policy responses present challenges 
to the conservative policies of the 1980s-2000s, while long-term structures and 
issues are likely to redirect governance significantly. Macroprudential policy 
now includes systemic risk and debt problems arising from booms in the cycle.
Monetary policy considers asset price instability as well as inflation. Fiscal
policy in practice cannot ignore functional finance. Alternative forms of global
money and reducing international payment instabilities are now a core element
of policy. While there is still some asymmetry in policy, international financial
crises can be useful in moderating ceremonial policy structures.
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Much of the world has been going through the worst financial and economic crisis 
since the Great Depression of the 1930s. The subprime crisis started when housing 
prices began to fall in the United States in 2007, continued through major liquidity 
crisis when Lehman Bros failed in late 2008, and adversely affected output through 
recession in many nations during 2009-2011. Numerous areas have joined this multi-
ple crisis (financial, economic, policy) through dealing with subprime bonds and the 
chains of bankruptcy affecting other institutions involved in the circuit of money 
capital. When a global financial panic emerged in late 2008, this led to a drop in li-
quidity which further affected output and employment in most nations. In total the 
subprime, liquidity and output crises have generated a major global crisis of confi-
dence, including deep recession in most major nations and many emerging and un-
derdeveloped ones. As a result some nations and transnational organizations have 
undertaken some very serious rethinking of macroprudential, monetary, fiscal and 
international policy, while the European Union and others have been reinforcing their 
neoliberal policy of cutting budget deficits. 
Most of the economic journals have had special sections or even whole issues 
on the crisis; and Panoeconomicus has joined this tendency in trying to ascertain the 
causes and consequences of the crisis and recession. For instance, in this journal 
Georgios P. Kouretas and Prodromos Vlamos (2010) examine the nature of the 
Greek crisis, paying special to rising private sector debt transferring to the public 
sector due to policy reactions to the financial crisis. Kosta Josifidis, Alpar Lošonc,  
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and Novica Supić (2010) argue that the crisis is cyclical and especially structural in 
origin, linked to the financial and economic instabilities generated by neoliberalism. 
In this light, the current paper accepts these arguments (see Phillip Anthony O’Hara 
2009) but concentrates instead on the practical policy architecture emerging from 
the subprime crisis. While general problems are emerging in terms of sovereign debt 
and public budgets, we are more interested in lesser known questions such as the 
changes emerging in the four areas of prudential, fiscal, monetary and global money 
issues. What specific policies (and policy issues) of a prudential, monetary, fiscal and 
international money nature have emerged from the crisis? Can improvements be 
made in these four areas? We differentiate between immediate policy responses and 
the likely long-term policy styles emerging from the crisis. 
 
1. Crisis and Immediate Policy Response 
 
As the international bubble (especially for advanced nations) that emerged during 
2004 to 2007 came to a halt the major property, finance and equity markets stalled 
and then declined as euphoria evaporated. Early problems in 2006 and 2007 were the 
closure of Ownit Mortgage Solutions and New Century in the US, two of the biggest 
lenders in the subprime market. Problems were brewing in Europe, which had bought 
masses of these Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs) (bonds) through Special 
Investment Vehicles (SIVs). Trying to evade Basel-II style capital adequacy rules by 
having SIVs off balance sheet posed great problems, once these special vehicles 
started to collapse. Banks thus started to put them back on their balance sheets (in-
cluding their growing liabilities) which led to massive losses.  
The UK giant HSBC was the first to be affected in this way in November 
2007, transferring US$45 billion onto its balance sheet. Then in December 2007 a 
whole host of other institutions followed suit, including Citigroup (transferring 
US$49b), Rabobank (US$7.6b), Standard Chartered (US$1.7b) and Societe Generale 
(which bailed out its SIV with a US$4.3b credit line). (Michel G. Crouhy, Robert A. 
Jarrow, and Stuart M. Turnbull 2008, p. 14). Problems continued through 2008 as the 
German Dresdner Bank provided US$17 credit to its SIV to avoid a firesale. Mono-
line insurers came under pressure and many failed since they had responsibility for 
US$127b of CDOs which depended mainly on subprime home loans. Globally, 
hedge funds also suffered losses as they had to guarantee multi-trillion dollars worth 
of credit default swaps for their clients. 
The first stage of the crisis, the liquidity crunch which started in late 2007 
throughout much of the globe, revealed a core series of contradictions in the institu-
tions. In the UK for instance, the new tripartite regulatory system, instituted in the 
late 1990s, was found seriously wanting. This tripartite system included the bank of 
England, which was given independence to concentrate on interest rates to control 
inflation, as well as being responsible for the stability of the financial system in gen-
eral. The Financial Services Authority (FSA) had the task of supervising the whole 
financial sector, particularly the individual banks. And the Treasury controlled fi-
nance if indeed this was required for stability or regulation.  
A new operating procedure was instituted in the UK, whereby banks could 
specify for each reserve maintenance period the quantity of cash required from the  
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reserve bank. If they needed less cash than already specified they could redeposit the 
surplus with the reserve bank (below the policy rate), and if they needed more cash 
than specified they could borrow from the reserve bank (above the policy rate). This 
new procedure worked well, until problems emerged at Northern Rock in August and 
September 2007, concerning wholesale securitized mortgage bonds. These problems 
became public knowledge as Northern Rock experienced declining confidence and 
deposit holders sought high volumes of cash. Northern Rock failed to gain the re-
quired liquidity, the takeover option fell through, and it was left to the government to 
solve the problem (Alistar Milne and Geoffrey Wood 2008).  
The Bank of England and the operating procedures thus failed to solve the li-
quidity crisis at Northern Rock because there was no effective system of deposit in-
surance, no system existed to provide substantial funds to institutions in need without 
the public reacting adversely, and Northern Rock was hardly too big to fail in the 
normal sense of the term. The government therefore did the only thing possible to 
reduce further lack of confidence, it intervened and eventually nationalized Northern 
Rock under public ownership. Further nationalizations followed in quite succession. 
For Milne and Wood (2008) three policy changes are required in the light of this ex-
perience. The first is to institute a general system of public deposit insurance up to a 
limit of around 35,000 pounds (since raised to 50,000). The second is to provide a 
workable system of liquidity for banks, against a broad array of collateral, at a pen-
alty rate and limited to about three months, where information is not readily available 
to the public. And the third is to reorganize takeover and bankruptcy rules to enable 
prompt closure, reorganization and payout; or takeovers/nationalisations.   
While the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Ben Bernanke, was saying in 
mid-2007 that he didn’t expect the subprime problems to affect the rest of the finan-
cial system or economy, it started to do precisely this soon after. The global credit 
crunch that emerged in late 2007 through 2008 was stage one in the subprime crisis. 
Linkages between problems in the subprime market, collateralized debt market, 
hedge market, investment banking, monocline insurers, money market corporations, 
government sponsored enterprises, and commercial banks led to problems in the gen-
eral economy. Declining confidence led to greater demand for money, the flight to 
quality, declining equity prices, and reduced consumption and investment. Investors 
sold mortgage backed securities, property and equities as safe alternatives such as 
government bonds became the order of the day.  
As a result, schemes were introduced or expanded, including interest rate re-
ductions, discount window funds, and assistance to mortgagees. Even before the li-
quidity crunch started in the US, the HOPE alliance (homeowners help group) was 
started to help mortgagees avoid foreclosure. The Federal Housing Administration 
scheme was greatly expanded to help mortgagees (re)finance their home. Project 
Lifeline was instituted to delay foreclosure for mortgagees at least 90 day delinquent 
on repayments to encourage loan modifications. Once the liquidity crunch started 
massive central bank interventions ensured from August 2007, including a combined 
injection of US$294b from European, US, Canadian, Japanese, Swiss, Australian and 
Singaporean reserve banks (Crouhy, Jarrow, and Turnbull 2008, p. 44). Other 
schemes were introduced, including the Primary Dealer Credit Facility, which wa-
tered down the collateral required of investment banks for loans from the Fed.   
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The credit crunch, equity and housing declines as well as flight to quality con-
tinued through 2008, especially for investment banks. In March 2008 Bear Stearn’s 
hedge funds underwent liquidity problems as their investments in securitized mort-
gage bonds falted and leverage was found to be much higher than officially an-
nounced. Because their positions were closely associated with J.P. Morgan (their 
banker) and other institutions, the Federal Reserve intervened to organize loans and 
then a takeover by J.P. Morgan. Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae experienced a major 
decline in the value of their stock in July 2008, which was very serious because these 
institutions were the backbone of the securitized mortgage bond market. Being gov-
ernment sponsored enterprises, though publically listed and private-sector institu-
tions, any problems here would potentially (and actually did) cause a major panic. 
Through July Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson organized a plan for an emergency 
US$300 billion loan and afterwards both agencies were effectively nationalized to 
bring them under public ownership (Paul Mizen 2008). 
Towards the end of 2008 a second stage of the crisis started: the financial 
panic. Up until then things had been fairly grim, but full-scale panic had not ensured. 
As Hyman P. Minsky (1982) indicated, a financial panic usually is elicited through 
the emergence of a surprise event, something unexpected that makes the system 
move from liquidity crunch to panic. This surprise event was the collapse of Lehman 
Bros on 15 September 2008, a large holder of subprime bonds. This was the biggest 
bankruptcy of an investment bank (worth US$50 billion) in the history of US capital-
ism, and was followed by successive crashes in the equity market. The “market” was 
stunned that it was not rescued by the authorities, due to “moral hazard” as treasurer 
Henry Paulson said; and the crisis that ensured led to the movement from liquidity 
crisis to financial panic (though Lehman Bros was eventually merged with other 
companies). Even though the government failed to act with Lehman Brothers, it ef-
fectively nationalized another investment bank, AIG, the same month through 80 
percent public ownership. Similar bailouts of ravaged assets were soon activated as 
the US government began a series of further nationalizations. 
Lehman Brothers had huge financial linkages throughout the circuit of money 
capital, which in turn linked closely to the real sector. The proceedings were called 
“The most important hearing ever conducted in a bankruptcy case” (Stephen Lubben 
2008, p. 1), and its aftermath “the latest intensification of the global financial crisis” 
(Willem H. Buiter and Anne Slbert 2008, p. 1) Strange though it may seem, all 
through the liquidity crisis the Federal Reserve had not expanded money base. In-
stead, being concerned mainly with inflation it had consistently exchanged relatively 
illiquid securities offered by the government security dealers for more liquid Treas-
ury securities, and then offset this through selling government securities in the open 
market to bring changes to the monetary base to zero. From September 2008 all this 
changed as the Fed obviously realized the problem of systemic crisis and that the 
inflation problem was not a concern. For the first time in recent history the Fed made 
massive net open market expansions of money base in September 2008 onwards, so 
that money base increased from around US$800b (July 2008) to US$1400b (October 
2008). The Fed thus changed course from purely reallocating credit to expanding  
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credit on a massive scale (Daniel L. Thornton 2008). It thus started to protect the sys-
tem through lender of last resort facilities in the open market. 
The Lehman Brothers failure led from liquidity crunch to financial panic, 
which intensified the ensuring recession in many nations. Lender of last resort poli-
cies were activated through [i] open market operations, accompanied by the [ii] Paul-
son Plan to inject US$700b into the system through fiscal policy. Costing around 
US$1 trillion, this combined plan was primarily linked to the US Treasury buying up 
massive amounts of useless securitized bonds and mortgage debt in exchange for 
Treasury dollars. Even motor vehicle manufacturers were “bailed out” to assist eco-
nomic recovery, while the limit on Deposit Insurance was raised to US$250,000 
(John Friedland 2009). For the first time the US authorities started to treat the crisis 
as a systemic problem and inflation control took a back seat. Suddenly it looked like 
a Great Depression could emerge, and therefore everything centered on overcoming 
the latest phase of the crisis. Just why the US authorities took so long to act to save 
the system from deep recession or worse evidently stems from its obsession with in-
flation control. Until September, they believed that the system was viable and that 
the financial architecture was essentially sound. This was now no longer the case, as 
major changes in policy and institutions were happening and also seen as necessary. 
Meanwhile in Europe things were heating up, especially after the liquidity cri-
sis moved into financial panic. Iceland had deregulated its financial system by the 
early 1990s, resulting in a major expansion of bank assets and liabilities. The finan-
cial system by the mid-late 2000s came to represent 80 percent of GDP, and the debt 
of the three big banks was six times Iceland’s GDP. The Icelandic banking model 
was fundamentally contradictory, due to it being a small country, having its own cur-
rency, with an exceptionally exposed deregulated banking system. Like most other 
institutions involved in the subprime crisis, they were highly leveraged, with mostly 
long-term assets but short-term liabilities, which set the scene for critical liquidity 
shortages followed by insolvency (with “fair value” pricing). The big banks could 
not borrow sufficient funds during the global liquidity crunch. This led to a bank run, 
a speculative attack on the currency, a decline in Iceland’s (Moody’s) risk assess-
ment from A+ to BBB- by early October 2008, and (despite loans from the IMF, EU 
nations and Russia) a Depression emerging in 2009 (Buiter and Slbert 2008). The 
three big banks–Landsbanki, Glitnir (Islandsbanki) and Kaupting–were placed under 
control of the Financial Supervisory Authority in October 2008. 
As Grahame F. Thompson (2010) has demonstrated, the “subprime crisis” has 
not been truly global due to several forces that generate an uneven pattern of per-
formance through time. For instance, the most severely affected areas of the world 
were the Baltics (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), followed by Eastern Europe (Ukraine, 
Russia) and then Western and Southeast Europe. Many nations of Eurasia, Latin 
America, Scandinavia and Sub-Saharan Africa were moderately-to-seriously af-
fected. A few nations of Central Europe, Asia and North America were moderately 
affected. Hardly any nations of the Middle East and Northern Africa were implicated 
in the crisis or recession, while most nations of SSA and Asia were unaffected. The 
real paradox is that the nation at the centre of the crisis, the US, was relatively mildly 
affected in terms of recession, compared with the most severely affected areas, de- 
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spite most of the media attention being on crisis and recession in the US (O’Hara 
2011). Another paradox is that the nations most implicated in sovereign risk prob-
lems (Greece, Portugal) were in the lowly-affected scale in terms of recession, al-
though it is true that Ireland was quite moderately-to-severely affected (though no-
where near as much as the Baltics and Eastern Europe) (World Bank 2011).  
Many nations are suffering according to the extent that their banking sectors 
have grown rapidly over recent decades, or are severely exposed to high debt levels. 
Many developing nations of Asia, such as China, have seen their growth affected but 
with still very high rates, despite problems with unemployment. Nations with close 
links to China, such as Australia, just missed out on a technical recession. Another 
irony is that the area most unaffected, the Middle East and North Africa, has been at 
the centre of some of the most revolutionary and destabilizing political changes of 
recent decades. The nations not significantly affected by the crisis are generally those 
with a “low level of financial sophistication” (Viorel Lefter, Andra-Maria Vasilescu, 
and Alina Mihaela Dima 2008), illustrating that there are sometimes considerable 
advantages of having a simple financial system. The world as a whole, however, ex-
perienced negative growth during 2009 (World Bank 2011). Overall, this is the worst 
crisis, as many analysts have already stated many times, since the Great Depression 
of the 1930s, for those with a sophisticated or historically rapidly growing financial 
system. 
 
2. New Financial Architecture & Long-Term Governance 
 
The financial architecture has been transformed by the subprime crisis and recession. 
Markets have been shown to be faulty, as the information provided has become 
opaque, ambiguous, inadequate, lacking substantial fundamentals, or otherwise of 
dubious authenticity. Investment banks have disappeared in some nations, such as the 
US, as they took on more risk than they realized and either went bankrupt or became 
banks instead. US financial policy has become radically transformed, as banks have 
been nationalized (in the US euphemistically called “conservatorship”), deposit in-
surance extended and fiscal policy legitimized. In Europe the rising public debt de-
signed to reduce private debt has ironically generated a new bout of neoliberalism as 
schemes are employed to reduce government spending. In the midst of this policy 
asymmetry, during 2010-2011 we saw numerous reactions against incumbent gov-
ernments, such as liberals in the US and UK and conservatives in Ireland and Ger-
many, the outcome of which is uncertain in terms of general policy activism. 
The question arises as to what will be the long-term economic and policy out-
come of this crisis, in terms not so much of general policy thrusts, but rather the spe-
cific and practical instruments of policy. Clearly a new financial architecture and 
policy regime will emerge globally. The crisis was so strong and so clearly exposed 
problems with core aspects of the national, regional and global regimes that major 
structural changes are in motion. The main difficulty is differentiating the crisis re-
sponse policies from more long-term ones, and it is to the latter that we now turn. 
There are four core issues that have collectively received quite superficial analysis in 
the literature and which are crucial to the long-term perspective. These include 
macroprudential, monetary, fiscal and international-money policy, discussed below.  
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2.1 Macroprudential Regulation 
 
In some nations and transnational organizations there has been movement since the 
crisis for a practical policy shift towards postneoliberal instruments and issues. Three 
issues stand out, namely those concerning deposit insurance, nationalization of banks 
and systemic risk. On the first of these, most nations majorly affected by the sub-
prime crisis have deepened the role of deposit insurance. Most of Europe (including 
Ireland, Iceland, Germany, UK, Sweden, Austria, Denmark, Greece) pro-
vided/extended universal deposit insurance, up to a limit of 40,000–70,000 Euros or 
Pounds during 2007/09. The US extended deposit insurance to US$250,000. Austra-
lia introduced unlimited deposit insurance for institutions within the banking system 
(including credit unions and building societies; but not investment banks, merchant 
banks, trusts, and other eclectic wholesale institutions). Some of these schemes are 
privately financed (mostly paid by the banks) and others are government guarantees. 
In this respect, policy makers have unwittingly concluded that moral hazard is less 
important than systemic uncertainty which insufficient insurance is likely to generate 
in times of crisis.  
The second issue of prudential policy is nationalization of financial institu-
tions. Most nations affected considerably by the crisis have engaged in a whole series 
of nationalizations of the banking system, or bringing them under regulatory control. 
Mostly this was due to issues such as “too big to fail”, such as in the case of the Ice-
landic banks and the UK Northern Rock bank. In the US, the US$700 Paulson Plan 
included two parts, the first being to buy preferred stock in troubled banks (partial 
nationalization), and the second to buy troubled assets (mortgage market bonds) to 
increase liquidity and solvency of institutions. The nationalization part of the plan is 
a major change in policy, but was seen as necessary to instill confidence in the sys-
tem. The second part of the plan, buying the troubled assets, was seen necessary to 
promote liquidity in the markets (these assets can then be sold later, reducing the loss 
on government budget). 
There are two main ways of nationalizing financial institutions. The first is to 
retain nationalization as a way of directly stabilizing markets. The second is along 
the lines of the Swedish example of the 1990s, with nationalizations being reversed 
once the crisis has settled down. Both options are occurring to some degree. The US 
will eventually sell many of the securities back to the private sector, except Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac; while in Europe fewer will move into the private arena. Re-
gardless of which options emerge, the process of nationalizing banks either temporal-
ity or permanently in a substantial crisis is a major change of policy and a challenge 
to neoliberalism which has generally argued for privatization, “period”. 
Likely the best way policy is to nationalize those institutions that are the big-
gest. This is the so-called “boundary problem” discussed in the literature. Charles 
Goodhart (2008) argues that using “size” as a criterion solves most problems. It 
means that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, for instance, should always have been na-
tionalized, partly because they were so large, and partly because they have been in 
the contradictory situation of pointing to their independence while alluding to their 
secure “public” position. In this context, hedge funds and private investment banks  
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need to remain moderately small or otherwise they generate too much power, finan-
cial clout and become too big to fail.  
A third issue of prudential policy is risk and uncertainty. Several innovations 
and institutions operating in the financial system during the 1990s and 2000s became 
highly risky and were a critical factor in the generation of the crisis. A core problem 
was the complex process by which mortgages were distanced from borrowers and 
lenders, repackaged as bonds, and then sold as even more complex collateral debt 
obligations. The earlier model of “originate and hold” changed to “originate and dis-
tribute”, where security originators redistributed them at a faster pace than quality 
allowed. Increasing distance between the underlying mortgages and securitized secu-
rities propelled multiple sources of risk. Some of these risks include “‘information 
fog’ (i.e. other than rating, no information to assess the risk exposure)”, along with 
“’illiquidity’ (in the absence of exchange traded secondary market for CDOs)”, as 
well as “‘shady valuation’ (where valuations are marked-to-model or marked-to-
myth… rather than marked-to-market)” (Sitikantha Pattanaik 2008, p. 89; also Chris-
tian Laux and Christian Leuz 2010).  
The mathematical models of risk used by the credit rating agencies assumed 
risk specificity and counter-cyclicality. Most of the symptoms of the crisis followed 
from these assumptions and the investment and financial behavior that they stimu-
lated. A core part of the solution to financial crises is thus to recognize the procycli-
cal nature of macroeconomic risk for capitalist economies. This involves gaining 
from the insights of Karl Marx (1894), Thorstein Bunde Veblen (1923), John Michal 
Kalecki (1937), and Minsky (1982), who recognized that cycle booms can generate 
substantial uncertainty and systemic risk since agents tend to forget about past crises. 
The excess investment and debt of the boom is often a bubble which exaggerates its 
durability. These political economists provide the lesson that agents should moderate 
their euphoria and not be overly seduced by a positive current business climate. This 
has significance for rating-agency reform, as many have realized the need for less use 
of so-called scientific calculative models of risk and more holistic methods, including 
general systemic data of cycles and alternative scenarios. Whether mere reforms of 
risk assessments are capable of moderating the systemic dynamics of investment and 
finance under conditions of endogenous cycles and waves, however, is a more fun-
damental problem not yet seriously discussed by the major policy institutions and 
departments. 
From the viewpoint of practical policy, however, stress testing is a core policy 
requirement into the future for risk assessment, where different assumptions are 
made about rates of growth, different market patterns and broader data are included 
(see International Monetary Fund 2010a). Institutions such as the Financial Stability 
Board (FSB), elements within the Federal Reserve, as well as the World Bank and 
UNCTAD, have finally incorporated this “rising systemic risk during the boom” in-
sight into their policy perspectives. To be generous to these policy institutions, it 
took them at least 35 years (since the crisis of the 1970s) to seriously note the prob-
lem and advocate changes to policy accordingly. In practice, this relates to strength-
ening macro-prudential policies to reduce procylical systemic risk in the financial 
system through moderating credit instabilities, fundamentally restructuring risk as- 
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sessment methods and stabilizing international flows of capital (see Financial Stabil-
ity Board, International Monetary Fund, and Bank for International Settlements 
2011). 
As for the use of Structured Investment Vehicles (SIVs) and related institu-
tions, their use should be prevented where they are used purely to evade capital ade-
quacy requirements. How the authorities could have effectively overlooked such a 
core problem has mystified many analysts. SIVs were used by (particularly) invest-
ment banks and other financial institutions for removing risky securities purchased 
through debt from their balance sheet. They gave a misleading indication of the debt 
and risk positions being held by institutions and thereby increased the system risk of 
the economy. Authorities must ensure that Basel III proposed changes to reduce sys-
temic risk and procyclicality are not evaded through institutional or instrumental “in-
novations” that contribute to financial and economic crises (see Nout Wellink 2011). 
These three issues of macroprudential policy have changed the nature of the 
policy environment substantially. Actively seeking to deepen deposit insurance, na-
tionalize financial institutions, and reduce risk during the upswing of the cycle are 
core changes in governance. They all address the problem of systemic crises, uncer-
tainty and protecting the system from market problems.  
 
2.2 Monetary Policy 
 
The past several decades have seen supposedly independent monetary authorities 
throughout the world having responsibility for inflation control as the core policy 
target. Official interest rates have been the prime instrument for controlling inflation. 
This policy environment was the outcome of a period of high inflation when double 
digit figures were common in advanced nations (1970s and 1980s) while three digits 
were common in developing countries (1980s and 1990s). It is also the result of a 
series of theoretical models ranging from monetarism, supply side economics, ra-
tional choice theory, real business cycle models and to some degree even new 
Keynesian philosophy.  
Three core changes have been or should likely be happening in the face of the 
subprime crisis and recession. The first is that, as noted above, financial regulators 
have become concerned with systemic financial and economic risk and crises. In this 
light, financial regulators need to supplement a concern with inflation of commodity 
prices with one for asset prices. A concern for systemic risk and asset prices leads 
one to conclude that reserve banks took too long to start increasing money base in the 
recent crisis, since if they had expanded liquidity earlier the movement from credit 
crunch to financial panic and full-blown recession might have been prevented. It is 
certainly the case that placing too much emphasis on moral hazard in the light of the 
Lehman Brothers collapse increased the degree of systemic uncertainty and lack of 
confidence. Investment banks were given too much latitude, engaging in excessively 
risky behavior which infected other institutions. In this environment, liquidity should 
have been increased much earlier in the US, or Lehman Brothers should have been 
nationalized in the public interest. 
Secondly, interest rate targeting needs to come under more critical scrutiny. 
There is no doubt that the crisis was in part a product of a monetary policy based on  
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low interest rates to push recovery and boom into action, followed by high interest 
rates to moderate potential inflation and economic activity. It is difficult to control 
inflation without also affecting real output and employment. Also, in the process it is 
difficult not to impact significantly on asset prices. The argument that the Fed cannot 
predict bubbles and should not attempt to influence them seems vacuous in the light 
of recent problems. The asset bubbles in real estate, equity, securities and resources 
were fundamentally the cause of the problem. By using interest rate targeting the way 
they did, the Fed encouraged both rising and crashing bubbles.  
Somehow governments and their regulatory authorities need to come to terms 
with new ways of moderating business cycles. Eventually interest rates will have to 
be used less to stimulate recovery and to moderate inflation. Asset prices have to be a 
core element of policy (see James Bullard 2010). More stability of interest rates will 
help moderate asset prices. There is some truth in the Austrian School proposition 
that reserve bank─induced changes in rates destabilize the long-term investment cli-
mate of capitalist economies. Where this view fails is in the assumption that asset 
bubbles are caused mainly by government intervention. Bubbles are generated 
through a process of circular and cumulative causation, in part contributed by the 
inefficiencies and failures of market processes.  
Thirdly, governments could utilize two policies to moderate bubbles as gener-
ated by the market process. The first is to institute Asset-Based Reserve Require-
ments (ABRR), where regulators could impose reserve requirements on potentially 
unstable assets held by financial institutions and possibly other companies (Thomas 
Palley 2004). They could target assets such as subprime mortgages, derivatives, or 
some new innovative securities, depending on the situation of the times. The reserve 
bank would require a certain percentage of such securities be held in an official ac-
count. The reserve ratio, and the securities included in the ratio, could be modified 
according to reserve bank research about changes in various asset prices. Clearly, 
asset bubble research would have to be given a high priority and much more knowl-
edge would help in this regard.  
The second policy, in addition or instead of this one, could be the policy of 
“leaning against the wind”. Sushil Wadhwani (2009), for instance, presents a case 
for an integrative or holistic interest rate policy, where changes in rates are made not 
only in relation to inflation but also asset prices. Taking a cue from the Swedish ex-
perience, interest rates may be moderated with an eye to inflation, crises of confi-
dence and asset prices. In the current environment this could mean interest rates may 
be low for a shorter period; not maintained excessively low for many years. It also 
means that during the later years of recovery and boom interest rates may not be in-
creased as fast as inflation would singularly dictate. If this were taken seriously by 
the authorities then monetary policy would be a part of a broader countercyclical 
framework, with economic agents having an eye to inflation of not only consumer 
and wholesale prices but also asset prices. After the current crisis we can no longer 
leave asset bubbles out of the policy architecture.  
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2.3 Fiscal Policy 
 
One of the major responses to the crisis, once it moved from a liquidity crunch to 
panic, was massive government spending and tax concessions to enhance consump-
tion and investment. Generally the packages were announced during late 2008 and 
into early 2009. The US package (Paulson Plan) included US$825 over ten years, 
including US$525 over two years. It involved tax cuts, mostly to consumers and 
some to firms, plus government investment spending. The European Commission 
proposed a 200 billion Euro package, coming partly from individual states and partly 
from the commission. The Chinese stimulus package, worth about US$500b, likely 
prevented a halving of growth in China as well as recession in many Asian nations 
plus Australia (Editorial 2009a). 
Three things have hampered fiscal policy (and indeed, monetary policy) from 
reducing the impact of the crisis on growth rates. The first is the continued domi-
nance of the neoliberal philosophy, which constrains the community from taking a 
proactive approach to the problem. The second is linked to this, namely, the inability 
of business and government to undertake careful and responsible research on finan-
cial and economic crises, including crisis response mechanisms for business, plus 
fiscal and monetary policy. Trying to deal with the crisis through sudden and appar-
ently ad hoc governance measures is hardly responsible management. This leads to a 
third factor, that the authorities acted too late, generally more than 12 months too 
late, since they assumed the immediate credit crunch would not lead to full-blown 
panic and recession.  
This leads to some serious questions about fiscal policy philosophies and ac-
tions. It is likely time the governments of the world pursued serious research on fi-
nancial and economic crises on an ongoing basis. It is also high time that govern-
ments seriously questioned orthodox fiscal views. One of the core theories in need of 
serious consideration is Lerner’s principles of functional finance. The first such prin-
ciple is a commitment to full employment levels of spending, where a balance is 
made between the twin objectives of full employment and inflation constraint. The 
second principle is one that has mostly been put into practice, but not officially le-
gitimized, namely, taxation should be modified according to the state of demand and 
not to requirements of government payments and receipts. The third rule has also 
been unwittingly accepted in practice if not theory, namely, that government should 
borrow money only when it is desirable that the public should have more bonds and 
less money; and visa-versa (Abba Lerner 1943). 
Broad changes in fiscal policy philosophy are required to fit into a research 
program committed to crisis prevention and management (Philip Arestis and Mal-
colm Sawyer 2010). It is indeed ironical that large government deficits have been 
achieved by mostly conservative administrations in recent decades, for instance, the 
Reagan and George W. Bush administrations. These were mostly due to tax cuts 
and/or large spending on wars or preparation for war. Otherwise surpluses tend to 
emerge when there is an economic boom. Indeed, government spending during 
downturns is often likely, ceteris paribus, to reduce deficits due to its positive impact 
on growth. Productive government spending is also desperately needed after decades 
of neglect, largely globally, of infrastructure, hospitals, schools and universities  
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(Jenny E. Ligthart and Rosa M. Martin Suárez 2011). Such spending has been shown 
to have robust positive crowding-in effects on private investment. 
 
2.4 International Money and Payments 
 
We come now to broader issues of developing nations, capital flows and the circuit 
of money capital between advanced and developing nations. There are three main 
paradoxes of the current crisis. The first is that nations not closely linked to sophisti-
cated financial deals to some degree were insulated from the crisis. This is a crisis 
primarily of highly developed capitalist economies plus economies financialising to a 
high level. Many developing nations had their growth halved, but still to only rea-
sonably low levels. The crisis has adversely affected world trade by up to 30 percent, 
and capital flows potentially up to 50 percent. Global confidence has declined con-
siderably (World Bank 2011).  
The second paradox is that when the advanced nations saw governance prob-
lems in the developing world in the late 1970s and early 1980s, they quickly imposed 
the Washington Consensus upon them through the IMF, World Bank and even 
UNCTAD. Latin America was the basis for their assessment, but this was also ap-
plied to Africa, the Middle East and eventually Asia. Now that major problems have 
appeared in the edifice of advanced nations, many are raising the question of the 
need for imposing radical changes on them. Some of these changes have been dis-
cussed above, but others include reducing major global payments imbalances and 
creating a truly global system of payments. 
The third paradox relates to US financial hegemony. The US has been trying 
to reestablish its global power financially, economically and militarily as challenges 
to this power have emerged. Immanuel Wallerstein (1983) argued that hegemony 
tends to arise first in agro-production, then in commerce and lastly in finance; and 
diminish along similar lines. The US has already long lost production dominance to 
other areas especially Asia, commercial dominance is now in the hands of transna-
tional corporations who tend to be increasingly footloose, while financial dominance 
is still present but faltering badly recently. This current crisis is a crisis not only of 
finance, economics and society, but US finance in particular. The US style of deregu-
lated finance with periodic innovation and minimal governance is increasingly seen 
as a failure, and will likely generate changes along different institutional lines. 
These three paradoxes are core contradictions impacting on the global political 
economy. One reason why the subprime crisis had strong international connections 
was the large US current account deficits which generated large capital account sur-
pluses. These surpluses included trillions of dollars of incoming credit from espe-
cially China, to buy mortgage-backed securities and credit swaps in case the securi-
ties failed. This represented a source of endogenous credit into the US economy, 
which expanded the boom and generated bubbles in housing, equities and resources. 
When confidence faltered in the subprime industry this left many overseas compa-
nies and governments with securities which were of ambiguous and faltering value. 
Essentially confidence in the US financial system declined and this has been ad-
versely affecting US financial dominance.  
  
 
13  International Subprime Crisis and Recession: Emerging Macroprudential, Monetary, Fiscal and Global Governance 
PANOECONOMICUS, 2011, 1, pp. 1-17
This does raise the question, however, about the problematic nature of increas-
ingly unequal capital and current account imbalances at the global level (see Karl 
Whelan 2010). The current system effectively works against developing nations with 
persistent current account deficits. Persistent current account deficits tend to lead to 
advice requiring higher interest rates and lower government spending (although since 
the Asian Crisis of the late 1990s some emphasis has been given to protecting the 
innocent with social safety nets). The failure of these policies is reflected in the ten-
dency for such advice to lead to lower growth and higher unemployment. The imbal-
ances have been especially problematic since the early 2000s when capital flows 
have been notably unstable. For instance, during the mid-late 2000s there has been 
enormous increase in debt and portfolio capital inflows into the US (capital account 
surpluses) to balance the increasing current account deficits. This provides the insti-
tutional basis for global disarray now that the US dollar is rapidly losing its hege-
monic power, unless suitable changes emerge. 
Policy options in the light of this problem are changing the international fi-
nancial architecture through the adoption of a policy to encourage greater balance. A 
well-known policy, initially advocated by Keynes and latterly by Paul Davidson, has 
been a system whereby current account surplus nations are required to stimulate ef-
fective demand to moderate these surpluses and thereby improve global growth out-
comes. Persistent current account surpluses generate a demand constraint that re-
duces global performance. Reducing this through conventions to expand demand, 
especially of a productive nature, tends to crowd-in global private investment and 
improve confidence in the system. Various detailed proposals have been developed 
along these lines (see Davidson 2004). Somewhat minor alternatives to this scheme 
are Tobin Taxes, capital controls and other regulations. 
A similarly crucial policy that needs activation is that of an alternative global 
currency. Having the US dollar as the main “global” currency is problematic since 
US monetary policy is primarily activated for domestic reasons, although it often 
adversely impacts on other countries through, for instance, changes in the value of 
interest rates and the US dollar. The ongoing financial and economic crisis has con-
vinced more policy activists of the need for an alternative global currency. So nu-
merous are these calls for a new currency that it is likely to soon be a reality. For in-
stance, the International Monetary Fund (2010b) has recently advocated the ex-
panded use of (modified) SDRs as a global source of money instead of the US dollar, 
while others argue for using the Chinese currency in this capacity, or an entirely new 
global currency. 
 
3. Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this paper has been to critically evaluate the interrelated policy envi-
ronment in the light of the global subprime crisis. We concentrated on macropruden-
tial, monetary, fiscal and global money issues. Our main conclusion is that a new 
(postneoliberal) environment has been stimulated by the crisis, considered at the 
technical level of analysis, which may become durable after the crisis subsides. 
Macroprudential regulation must now centre on problems of systemic risk and uncer-
tainty rather than simply moral hazard. In this new light, expansion of deposit insur- 
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ance, nationalization, Kaleckian and Minsky insights into systemic crises, controls 
over structured investment vehicles and regulating especially large institutions have 
come to the fore of policy-making.  
Monetary policy likely requires some attention to asset price bubbles, a critical 
reflection on interest rate policies which tend to stimulate cyclical tendencies, asset 
based reserve requirements, leaning against the wind, and the need to develop a 
deeper research culture into crisis management. Fiscal policy is moving some gov-
ernance institutions toward a pragmatic program involving traditional discretionary 
policy and functional finance. Global money issues have become pressing as prob-
lems emanate from the core rather than periphery. This will likely stimulate more 
policy changes to the current regime of global finance. Adopting demand-enhancing 
policies likely moderates imbalances of global payments and generates a more stable 
environment, as do new sources of global money that are emerging. 
Overall the subprime crisis has enabled a critical series of debates and policies 
that question prevailing orthodoxies about moral hazard and deregulation of finance. 
Martin Konings (2009) argued that the move to financialisation over the past three 
decades has enhanced the Federal Reserve’s and Treasury’s ability to control finance. 
This has not happened noticeably through the subprime financial crisis and recession 
as US power continues to slide. This paper has shown that quite major changes have 
been and are continuing to impact on policy instruments and targets in most nations 
as well as through transnational institutions. On balance, this has been a challenge to 
orthodox theories and policies, especially concerning risk, asset bubbles, government 
finance and global money. 
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